The current crisis of intensive work regimes and the question of social exclusion in industrialized countries by Mingione, Enzo
www.ssoar.info
The current crisis of intensive work regimes and
the question of social exclusion in industrialized
countries
Mingione, Enzo
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Mingione, E. (1997). The current crisis of intensive work regimes and the question of social exclusion in industrialized
countries. (Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt
Arbeitsmarkt und Beschäftigung, Abteilung Organisation und Beschäftigung, 97-105). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-128519
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
discussion paper WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLINFÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
CENTER BERLIN
FS I 97 - 105
The Current Crisis of Intensive
Work Regimes and the Question of
Social Exclusion in Industrialized Countries
Enzo Mingione
December 1997
ISSN Nr. 1011-9523
Research Area:
Labour Market and
Employment
Forschungsschwerpunkt:
Arbeitsmarkt und
Beschäftigung
Research Unit:
Organization and
Employment
Abteilung:
Organisation und
Beschäftigung
*c/o Fondazione Bignaschi,
20123 Milano, Italy
ZITIERWEISE / CITATION
Enzo Mingione*
The Current Crisis of Intensive
Work Regimes and the Question of
Social Exclusion in Industrialized Countries
Discussion Paper FS I 97 - 105
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 1997
Forschungsschwerpunkt: Research Area:
Arbeitsmarkt und Labour Market and
Beschäftigung Employment
Abteilung: Research Unit:
Organisation und Organization and
Beschäftigung Employment
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin
Abstract
The aim of this article is to analyze the difficulties currently being faced by regimes of
social regulation of economic life and the ways in which they are being transformed.
In order to address this complex question, transformations in the labour market are
examined. Emphasis is given in particular to the fact that the decline in life-time jobs
has had a destabilizing impact on employment systems. This is true not so much in
terms of reduced employment. In fact, numerous job opportunities have been
created in the tertiary sector, though insecure and badly paid, but these jobs do not
reflect the traditional standards of social regulation and therefore entail a weakening
of the mechanisms of social integration and a growing risk of exclusion. At this point
the theme of the heterogeneity and polarization of working careers in service society
is introduced, highlighting in particular the variety of regulatory forms with their
different and changing mixes of family, state and market. These policy mixes form
the basis for the various models of welfare capitalism identified here.
Finally, consideration is given to the two main responses to this transitional
phase in industrialized countries. On the one hand, in English-speaking countries
which are characterised by intensive deregulation and the spread of flexible forms of
work; on the other hand, in the countries of continental Europe where the
redistributive modes of traditional welfare programmes have been preserved. Neither
of these strategies, however, has produced new and lasting prospects for synergies
between the economy and the society. Potential regulatory innovations would
presuppose a reappraisal of modes of activity that are at present „invisible“ such as
production for own consumption, family care, volunteer and charitable work and the
creation of social capital. Political steps in this direction could lead to a new balance
between state, market and family that would secure the level of cooperation needed
for socially embedded economic life.
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz analysiert die gegenwärtigen Schwierigkeiten, mit denen verschiedene
Regimes sozialer Regulierung der Wirtschaft konfrontiert sind, einschließlich ihrer
Transformationspfade. Um dieser komplexen Fragestellung gerecht zu werden,
werden zunächst die allgemeinen Veränderungsprozesse auf dem Arbeitsmarkt
dargestellt. Besonderes Gewicht wird dabei auf die Tatsache gelegt, daß der Abbau
von lebenslangen Arbeitsverhältnissen das Beschäftigungssystem massiv
destabilisiert. Das bezieht sich nicht ausschließlich oder gar vorrangig auf die
rückläufigen Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten. Gleichzeitig sind nämlich im
Dienstleistungssektor zahlreiche neue Arbeitsplätze entstanden - wenn auch in der
Regel unsichere und schlecht bezahlte. Sie spiegeln ein geringeres Maß
gesellschaftlicher Regulierung und implizieren damit eine schwächere soziale
Integration sowie ein höheres Risiko sozialer Ausgrenzung. In diesem
Zusammenhang werden die Trends zur Heterogenisierung und Polarisierung der
Berufsbiographien in der Dienstleistungsgesellschaft thematisiert und dabei
besonders die Vielfalt der länderspezifischen Mischungen von Zuständigkeiten von
Familie, Staat und Markt dargelegt. Diese bilden die Grundlage für die in diesem
Beitrag identifizierten Modelle wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Kapitalismen.
Es lassen sich zwei verschiedene Reaktionsmuster der Industriestaaten auf
diese Veränderungsprozesse unterscheiden. Auf der einen Seite stehen USA und
Großbritannien mit ihren ausgeprägten Deregulierungspolitiken und der Ausweitung
von flexiblen Arbeitsverhältnissen; auf der anderen Seite die Länder
Kontinentaleuropas, die auf die Beibehaltung der Transferorientierung traditioneller
Wohlfahrtsprogramme setzen. Keine dieser Strategien führte jedoch zu neuen und
dauerhaften Synergie-Effekten zwischen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die
Möglichkeiten für innovative Regulierungen - so die hier vertretene These - sind
daran gebunden, daß bislang „unsichtbare“ Produktionen aufgewertet werden, wie
beispielsweise Produktion zum Eigenverbrauch, unbezahlte Tätigkeiten wie
Familienarbeit, Solidarität und die Bildung von sozialem Kapital. Ein solcher Ansatz
könnte richtungsweisend sein für ein neues regulatives Gleichgewicht, das den
Mindestanforderungen an Kooperation Rechnung trägt und damit die Voraussetzung
für ein sozial integriertes Wirtschaftsleben gewährleistet.
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11. The decline of standardized wage work and the rise of mass
unemployment
In all industrial countries, the regulation of work is today beset by difficulties
whose repercussions are rising long-term unemployment1 and/or the spread of
unstable forms of employment providing inadequate income. The result is an
increase in social inequalities and chronic poverty in the form of social exclu-
sion (Mingione, 1996a). What are viewed as the main causes of these difficul-
ties - globalization and industrial restructuring, the demographic transition and
population ageing, rising public expenditure to sustain ever more costly welfare
systems (Esping Andersen, 1996) - are nothing other than the outcomes of the
varied interweaving of market tensions and the forms of social regulation that
allow work regimes to exist in a climate of social organization.
In this paper, the question of the current transition is examined starting
from some basic assumptions. These are grounded on the idea that the forms
assumed by society derive both from varied processes of historical change and
from the persistence of differences that crystallize into models of society. In
these models the tensions produced by growing individualism, technological
progress and the extension of market relations interweave with diversified
social reactions. The patterns of these reactions are depending on the
particular responses in terms of sociality and culture that can be brought into
play by the relevant actors or group of actors (Mingione, 1991 and 1997). The
use of the concept of historical cycles starts from the assumption that the
transformation of capitalist societies can be interpreted in terms of long cyclical
processes of variable duration, characterized by a succession of short cycles of
expansion and crisis (Arrighi, 1994). By focusing on capitalist societies rather
than capitalism, a first historical cycle (end of XVIII century to world war one)
can be identified, based on extensive social regulation that replaced traditional
social institutions with others to ensure social order in the face of the spread of
individualism, monetary consumption and wage work. During the second
historical cycle (world war one to the economic crises of the 1970s),
characterized by intensive social regulation, a selective social regime (family
wage, stable adult male employment, breadwinning assets) compatible with the
expansion of large manufacturing industry and rising labor productivity was
perfected. It is since the crises of the 1970s that a new phase may have begun,
                                                          
1 By international convention long-term unemployment is defined as seeking employment for a
continuous period of twelve months. In almost all European countries, not only did the long-
term unemployment rise as a share of total unemployment during the 1980s, but also the
average number of months in unemployment increased, in some regions to over three years
(Benoit-Guilbot and Gallie, 1995).
2based on flexible or fragmented social regulation, characterized by
deregulation, unstable family and work regimes, and the replacement of the
quantity-profitability combination with that of quality-consumption and global
financial and communication flows as hegemonic economic factors. Within this
historical framework, the assumption is that we are now in a phase of transition
from the intensive cycle, based on the synergy between the development of
large institutional structures and economic growth, to a flexible and fragmented
cycle where competition recovers its vigour and family and work biographies
are more and more unstable and heterogeneous. Under the conditions of the
transition, the problem, in general, is that those standardized forms of selection,
division and protection of the labor supply that coincided with the higher and
higher levels of productivity imposed by the intensive cycle, particularly during
the last phase called "Fordism", are no longer adequate. Within this paper,
attention is focused on employment changes in the various national and local2
contexts, and it is assumed that the changes under way tend to produce a
deficit of social integration in various forms, which is reflected in the emerging
question of exclusion.
In this section I start by arguing that industrial restructuring and the decline
of stable contractual employment in large concerns have destabilized the social
regulation of work everywhere in the industrialized world. This process has
produced a mix of two syndromes - increasing unemployment and the diffusion
of precarious forms of work - that are equally undermining the traditional
„Fordist“ regulation regimes. These balanced through various forms of
redistribution the direct access to resources and the capacity for survival and
social and cultural integration. In the second section I take a closer look at the
service employment regimes as they matured differently in the various models
of welfare capitalism. I argue that it is mainly the expansion of service jobs
which is producing employment polarization and the precarization of working
biographies. In the third section I explore how the diffusion of flexibility,
precariousness and low-income jobs is constituting an open wound in the
regulation regimes favouring increasing trends towards social exclusion. In the
concluding section I compare the two predominant political responses to the
transitional trends: neoliberal strategies favouring the flexibilization of working
experiences and the radical defence of welfare regimes and institutions. I argue
that they are both insufficient for creating new trends in economic development
accompanied by the social bonds necessary for a workable level of social
cooperation and integration.
                                                          
2 The basic politico-geographical unit on which industrial societies are constructed are the
nation-states as they formed during the extensive cycle and developed institutionally during
the intensive phase. The transition poses some problems also in this regard, above all be-
cause the nation-state is gradually losing its regulatory capacity to the benefit of both supra-
and sub-national entitites. It is for this reason that here, although the basic societal unit con-
sidered is almost always still the national one, reference is made to localities and regions and
to supra-national entities such as the European Union.
3The employment systems have been subjected to changes, at a faster rate
after the 1970s oil crises, that have as their hub combinations of deindustriali-
zaton - declining employment in big manufacturing industry - and tertiarization -
growing employment in more or less innovative and advanced, public and pri-
vate services. Following these changes, overall employment has gone up in
some places (above all the US, Japan and the Scandinavian countries, but also
in those European regions characterized by dynamic micro firms) and down in
others (in almost all countries in central and southern Europe). In all of them,
however, it has become more heterogeneous and less marked by the standard
of continuous employment with family income for the head of the household,
based on standard labor contracts and legally authorized forms of self-em-
ployment (Supiot, 1994), thus making it necessary to redesign the mechanisms
of social regulation. It is this process that is reflected in increasing problems,
greater fragmentation and new boundaries between the included and the ex-
cluded.
Deindustrialization and industrial restructuring have resulted from the big
increases in productivity that characterized the manufacturing cycle in the
golden age of the thirty years following world war two. The oil crises and local
cyclical crises have helped to intensify an essentially structural process. Such
big increases in the productivity of labor in the concentrated productive sectors,
above all consumer durables, are in the long run reflected in decreased
employment since they cannot be sustained indefinitely by exponentially rising
consumption in Western industrial countries and export markets are under
strong competition. Globalization and industrial restructuring have complicated
the picture by promoting the entry on the scene of new zones of production (in
particular the Asiatic tigers) and various forms of relocation and reorganization
of large companies.
Declining employment in large companies, on which was centred the regu-
lation combining selection of supply and conditions of high productivity at all
skill levels of the workforce, is having a destabilizing impact on work systems
even where unemployment is not going up. The effect is the diminishing of the
benign circuit that balances the modes of regulation against the rises in pro-
ductivity. Socialized in the industrialized world in terms of continuous and high-
productivity careers at an income in line with a high cost of living, a growing
share of the labor supply can no longer find suitable forms of employment. All
the industrial countries are thus entering into a phase of chronic excess of
labor. This is not an absolute excess and in fact numerous work opportunities
are appearing in the tertiary sector, though many are too unstable and poorly
paid to match potential workers' life expectations and strategies. What we have,
then, is an imbalance that is affecting the very modes of work regulation. This
also explains why the phenomenon has led to different syndromes, which have
generally been put down to the greater virulence of industrial restructuring or
the failure of economic policies, factors that on the contrary have not been of
decisive importance.
4The two most evident negative syndromes from the crisis in the regulative
balances have been rising levels of long-term and mass unemployment and the
spread of precarious inadequately paid jobs, both accompanied by heightened
social inequality. The first syndrome is typical of some European countries
while the second has its epicentre in the US. But in all cases, we find complex
mixes of phenomena relating also to self-employment and small firms, the wel-
fare system and the social profile of the unemployed and of precarious workers.
This mix affects in different ways the repercussions for life strategies deriving
from a more or less long period of job-seeking or a work situation that does not
enable reproduction of labor power under existing conditions of social and
cultural integration.
As against the low levels of the early 1970s, the rise in unemployment has
hit all advanced industrial countries, though at different times and in various
ways3. It has been more massive in European countries, which has also to do
with the increased waiting times and hence the share of the long-term jobless. It
is especially with regard to the latter that the nature of the problem, that is the
crisis in labor markets regulation, is more apparent. Practically in every case,
prolonged joblessness has been concentrated among subjects whose personal
and social characteristics entail the unacceptability of downgraded working ca-
reers but who, at the same time, find no alternative work and are in one way or
another sheltered by various combinations of state subsidy and family help. In
the countries of southern Europe they are predominantly the young, even those
with average levels of school achievement, maintained by their families of
origin. In Germany, they are often adults near to retirement age and assisted in
surviving by unemployment benefit and the minimum income subsidy. In all
European countries, unemployment is prevalently female, except for the UK
where women seek and find part-time jobs while men cannot afford to do this.
Lastly, the Scandinavian countries, which once seemed immune4 have been hit
by unemployment. Here the importance of the regulative question has been
even more manifest. The difficulty in absorbing the new generations of labor
supply by the private sector has been offloaded onto the public sector, which to
meet the growing cost-induced financial crisis (in the Scandinavian countries
the unemployed are entitled to quite a high benefit as one of the social rights of
citizenship) has been forced to drop some secondary spending plans, thereby
causing unemployment to rise within a spiralling effect difficult to check.
                                                          
3 See in this regard, among others, Malinvaud, 1984; D’Iribarne, 1990; Benoit-Guilbot and
Gallie, 1995; Reyneri, 1996.
4 It first set foot in Denmark, where in the 1980s it settled at levels higher than the European
average. Then it erupted in Finland, rising rapidly to extremely high levels and, finally,
reached Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s. Here it exploded in the space of a few
months from a negligible 2% up to medium-high rates of 8 to 10%, where it then settled.
5The fact that the employment crisis is rooted in the systems for regulating
work regimes makes it difficult to deal with and leads to numerous misinterpre-
tations. An example is the question of the education level and occupational
qualifications of the jobless. As often5 unemployment hits poorly educated and
qualified subjects, politicians and academics think that its main cause lies in the
oversupply of poorly qualified labor and, consequently, the best way to combat
it is to raise the level of education and occupational training of the masses6. In
reality, the picture is more complex. Poorly educated subjects do not find work -
or, more frequently, are forced to accept downgraded work careers - because
the typically Fordist combinations of semi-skilled labor and high levels of pro-
ductivity that permitted acceptable standards of living are disappearing7. This
situation cannot be redressed by raising the general level of education and
training, which always ends by pushing up the minimum qualifications for ob-
taining a job, but rather by aiming for new acceptable balances starting from the
transformation of what are now downgraded and unacceptable work careers.
The fact is that in the industrial countries the jobless are not such as a result of
being poorly educated or qualified but because - at least if they have practical
alternatives, that is are not literally starving to death without work - they shun
being caught up in work careers that do not provide for reproduction at satis-
factory levels of social and cultural integration in the community of belonging
and almost inevitably lead to social exclusion. This is precisely where the differ-
ence lies between the US and continental European countries (Esping-Ander-
sen, 1996). The most accurate indicators of the difference are those for the
                                                          
5 Italy represents in part an exception since the incidence of unemployment is persistently
higher among those with secondary-school diplomas than those without (see Reyneri, 1996,
chap. 6). This exceptional case is easily explainable by reference to the modes of social
regulation. Since the unemployed are prevalently young southerners, and most of these fe-
male, we have to take into account both that poorly educated young southern females are
dissuaded from entering the official labour market and that poorly educated males from low-
income families cannot afford to spend long looking for a good job and thus end up accepting
downgraded work careers. Given that the latter often fall back into intermittent unemployment
while, after a long wait, those with a secondary-school diploma find permanent employment,
at over 25 years of age, Italy ceases to be an exception because the incidence of unemploy-
ment among poorly educated subjects becomes once again high (Pugliese, 1995 and 1995a;
Mingione and Pugliese, 1995).
6 Esping-Andersen (1995; 1996) insists a great deal on this point, particularly as regards the
countries of southern Europe. He is not alone in this respect as almost all observers maintain
that interventions in education and training are decisive regardless of social regulation and of
existing work opportunities. Also, the long-term evidence on the ineffectiveness of occupa-
tional training courses for the unemployed in areas of high joblessness has been explained
by the poor quality of such courses rather than by serious underlying problems.
7 The process began even earlier with the gradual disappearance of Taylorist forms of work
organization (such as assembly lines), in which an unskilled worker with little education, ex-
perience or job training can be integrated into a, relatively speaking, high-productivity work
organization.
6population under the severe poverty line (the American poverty line, which
measures absolute poverty, is now more or less equivalent to the relative
poverty line used in Europe but calculated at 40%). While the share of the
population below this threshold in the US stands in the 1990s at 14% (35
million) with the quota of children rising to 20% (13 million), in continental
Europe the estimate for severe poverty is around 8% (under 20 million) of the
population with a similar percentage for children (under 5 millions). On the other
hand, the average unemployment rate in continental Europe (11%) is today
more than twice that in the US (5%).
The transition in employment is complicated by the fact that nowhere is it
possible to speak of an absolute antithesis between good and bad occupations,
the latter always destined to pull subjects towards social disintegration and ex-
clusion. This question is analysed in more detail in the next section in the con-
text of tertiarization and employment polarization. Here, mention must be made
of the, often neglected, problem of the possible connections between transition
in employment, mass unemployment and self-employment or employment in
small enterprises that persist and remain more extensive and flexible than
where wage labor is used.
The fact that the highest unemployment levels of the last twenty years are
to be found in places, like Spain or southern Italy, where many traditional micro
enterprises persist even outside of agriculture, implies that an explanation
should be sought also in this area of employment regimes. At a high level of
productivity and mass consumer culture that compels the less innovative micro
enterprises to push cost-cutting and the extension of their activities to their ex-
treme limits so as to compensate for the productivity gap, the jobs they offer
also become impracticable work itineraries, above all for young people who
have attained a minimum degree of education. This explanation has already
been widely accepted with regard to agricultural activities, but more recently it
has been extended to artisanal and commercial undertakings that have been
unable to embark on an innovative course: the entire area of retail and street
trade, repair and traditional handicraft shops and so on. The same argument
also helps to explain the different levels of unemployment between on one side
Spain and southern Italy and, on the other, Portugal and Greece. In the latter
two cases, characterized by unemployment levels below the European aver-
age8, work opportunities in traditional micro enterprises are still in part feasible
given the lower level of local productivity and the climate of lower expectations
and weaker conditions of social integration. Similar reasoning can be applied to
the difference in the US between some minority groups (especially Afro-Ameri-
cans and Puerto Ricans), hit harder by unemployment and less engaged in
                                                          
8 Whereas the level of unemployment in Greece and Portugal (between 4 and 8%) has always
been lower than that in Spain and Southern Italy (between 15 and 25%) the characteristic
phenomena are the same: a high concentration among young people of first-job seekers and
long-term unemployed, generally with no benefit (IARD, 1996).
7micro entrepreneurship, and recent immigrants, conversely more active as
ethnic entrepreneurs and in bad jobs and less affected by unemployment.
2. The polarization of work experiences in service societies
The restructuring of manufacturing industry has helped to make the job scene
more heterogeneous by decreasing guaranteed jobs in the large companies
and increasing them in the secondary segment, in the small subcontracting
firms, in the areas of decentralization and relocation and in the newly develop-
ing semi-peripheral regions. However, the quantitative extent of industrial re-
structuring has been relatively modest when compared to its destabilizing im-
pact on labor regulation systems. They have never depended on manufacturing
industry being homogeneous or involving most of the population but, rather, on
the employment conditions typical of big industry constituting the parameter for
work regime regulation. This framework was effective under two preconditions:
a cycle of expansion and concentration of industrial employment and the
conditions typical of high-productivity manufacturing industry being able to im-
pact on all modes of employment, inducing adjustments and restrictions also in
self-employment and in micro enterprises9. Deindustrialization has disrupted
this picture. Moreover, employment changes in manufacturing, which observers
are right to pay close attention to since they are connected with what is still the
central parameter of regulation, affect an ever smaller part of the employment
landscape in the advanced economies. Here the majority of the working popu-
lation (over 60%) is employed in the tertiary sector and practically all new jobs
are created in services. The heterogeneous and polarized nature of contempo-
rary employment regimes derives chiefly from the features of the tertiary sector,
which is subjected to a growth dynamic unlike that typical of manufacturing in-
dustry. In order to understand what is taking place in the world of work, we
therefore need to examine closely the question of employment regimes in the
tertiary sector (Sassen, 1991; 1996).
Employment in the tertiary sector is of great importance not only due to its
quantitative predominance but also because it is characterized by a great va-
riety of regulative forms - those diverse combinations of care work undertaken
by family members, public services and private services that make up one of
the parameters on which the models of welfare capitalism are constructed. The
determination of the different models of welfare capitalism is based principally
on state, market and family as the main sphere for social regulation, the aim of
which is to ensure individual and family welfare and thus solve the problem of
                                                          
9 Take, for example, the impact of "workers' statutes of rights" that have been agreed on and
formulated in the big manufacturing companies, but have then had direct or indirect regula-
tive effects on almost all areas of employment by fixing a central standard for work careers,
adopted as a parameter for the configuration of other jobs.
8social order. Following this line of thought, Esping-Andersen (1990) distin-
guishes three models of welfare capitalism: the liberal model (US, UK), char-
acterized by a relative prominence of the market and a pronounced individual
dependence on monetary income from wage work; the social-democratic model
(Scandinavian countries), in which the state takes on a central role in the direct
universalistic supply of welfare services thereby limiting individual and family
reliance on market-produced income; and the conservative model (continental
Europe), which is marked by the more central position of the family and
voluntary organizations, manifested in the spread of self-employment and small
and medium-sized family enterprises. In a recent work (Mingione, 1997) I have
put forward the hypothesis that during the intensive historical cycle, the models
of welfare capitalism increased to at least five. The reason is that the liberal
model divided into a populist variant (US) and more statist versions and, above
all, after world war two there was a clear divergence within the conservative
area between statist variants characterized by the influx of guest workers
(central Europe) and familistic variants characterized by weaker and more di-
versified development and by the persistence of emigration. This variety,
moreover, has the big effect of diversifying the quality of life for different groups
in diverse social contexts. It is therefore reasonable to assume with much pru-
dence that, at least in part, the main regulative axis of employment systems is
shifting from the manufacturing to the service sector.
We will start from an economic interpretation of the typical dynamics in the
tertiarization process and then add some remarks on work regulation10. The line
of interpretation is based on two assumptions. The first rests on Ernst Engel's
law of the hierarchy of consumption at varying income levels. According to this
law, industrial development engenders a rise in the propensity to consume
along a scale with at the bottom the satisfaction of minimum subsistence
needs, first of all for food, clothing and shelter, and at the top luxury goods and,
above all, sophisticated services inessential for physical survival. Economic
growth and the consequent rise in average income lead to a more than propor-
tional increase in the demand for services. The second assumption lies in the
consideration that the several branches of the economy vary in their capacity to
increase labor productivity through organizational and technological innovation.
A large part of the tertiary sector is, for technical reasons, at least partly
impervious to increases in labor productivity. Organizational and technological
innovation more often serves to improve the quality of the service or to mass
market it. Consequently, a persistent technological and productivity gap is
opened up with negative repercussions on the employment regime. Services, in
particular those with a lower potential for increasing labor productivity, are wit-
nessing marked rises in costs and prices caused by the need to raise employed
workers' incomes so they can keep up with rising costs and living standards,
driven up in turn by increases in productivity in the other branches of the econ-
                                                          
10 Generally speaking, this line of interpretation is similar to that used by Gershuny (1978;
1983; and Miles, 1983) to explain the emergence of the self-service society.
9omy. Within the process of tertiarization, the combination of the two assump-
tions entails an exponentially expansive circuit fed, on one side, by rising de-
mand as a consequence of economic growth and, on the other, by persistently
low productivity, reflected in tendencies towards big jumps in employment that
are difficult to check through technological labor-saving strategies and faster
work tempos.
At this point, what we have is a plausible explanation for the expansive
cycle of employment in the tertiary sector, which does not however square with
the dominant modes of social regulation, where selection and profitability of
labor adapt to increases in productivity. Hence the argument unfolded so far
does not explain why this circuit has not been curbed by severe crises in costs
and prices. In reality, tertiarization is accompanied by a variable mix of combi-
nations, starting from the development of the welfare state, that up to a certain
point explains the durability of the staggering growth and, at the same time,
shows how conflicts have arisen in the work-regulating regimes.
In short, the issue in its varied forms in the diverse contexts is the following.
Tertiarization produces a growing proportion of low-productivity work opportuni-
ties - their low productivity has nothing to do with their social utility - that are not
in principle compatible in terms of income, stability and employment guarantees
with the costs and life strategies of the community of belonging; hence they do
not reflect the conditions of the dominant social regulation and lead to a weak-
ening of the social integration mechanisms and growing risk of social exclusion.
Up to a certain point, this conflict does not reach unsustainable levels because
the modes of regulation keep it under control through various combinations of
four different modes. The first is expansion in welfare services supplied directly
by the state. In the second case, a persistently large part of the demand for
services is borne by families, with innovations in unpaid female care work which
are financed through a mix between strong fiscal implementation of family
wages, on one side, and discouragement of female paid work and
developments in care specialization, on the other side. Next we have the
development of self-servicing to include the user's unpaid labor at the supply
stage (restaurants, shops, department stores, petrol stations, and so on)11.
Above all, ways of working are spreading that in themselves do not offer
sufficient guarantee of integration, but where social compatibility derives
indirectly from the activity's complementary profile (multiple jobholding, part-
time work by married women, occasional jobs done by students, etc) or from its
temporary consonance with workers' life conditions and projects, particularly in
the case of immigrants. What remains to be understood are the social
consequences of diverse mixes and the reasons for which all possible
                                                          
11 Gershuny gives an extensive interpretation of self-service, which also includes the use of
the motor-car as a means of transport (in place of the train or tram) or the spread of televi-
sion to replace other free-time recreational services, such as cinema and theatre.
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combinations are today inadequate for shoring up the intensive regimes of
working activity regulation.
The models of welfare capitalism have developed combinations that in-
clude all the components. However, the predominance of public services is
typical of the social-democratic model. The liberal (or laissez-faire) model is
characterized by prevalence of private services, which entails the vigorous
growth of poorly guaranteed and badly paid jobs. Lastly, the conservative vari-
ants have displayed a greater propensity for keeping a sizeable share of care
services inside the family, carried out by unpaid female labor. In the long run, all
three itineraries tend to destabilize the social regime, though in different ways.
The social-democratic path is in difficulty because it feeds a circuit of high-cost
and rising public spending, generating in addition an employment ghetto for
women that leaves the question of gender inequality unresolved. Once built,
this gilded cage (desired by a large part of the moderate left throughout the
world as it keeps social inequalities at minimum levels in a climate of political
liberty) is difficult to get to grips with at its weak points: the high cost of welfare
and the ghettoization of female labor. The laissez-faire path is directly disrupted
by employment polarization, which once the limits of compatibility with the
regulative regime have been passed, engenders rampant chronic poverty. It is
here that employment polarization is immediately apparent whereas in the
social-democratic path it is concealed by the particular conditions of
employment in public services and in the conservative path by the high shares
of unpaid female domestic and care work. The latter path has not entered into
crisis so much for the more predictable reason of its lesser capacity for
economic growth. This obstacle has been overcome, at least in the dynamic
variants, by encouraging innovative solutions both in domestic and care strate-
gies and in small family enterprises in general. Growing tensions have derived,
rather, from the fact that even the combination of innovative families and basic
public services cannot hold out beyond a certain level of growth in tertiarization
and the parallel fragmentation of the social fabric. Here, too, difficulties arise
due to the high cost of public welfare, though in different terms to those in the
Scandinavian countries12; in addition, families (women) are unable to withstand
beyond a certain point the excessive load of responsibility in the systems of
caring, above all under demographic conditions characterized by family
instability and the multiplication of increasingly sophisticated and special care
needs within a heavily bureaucratized framework.13
                                                          
12 In the case of the conservative variants, the unsustainable circuits of public spending are
produced by the transfers to families, pensions systems, measures in favour of greater
selectivity of the labour supply and the cost of caring (Esping-Andersen, 1996).
13 The implementation of the conservative variants of welfare capitalism comprise various
contradictions that have not been explored in depth, also because they rarely find ex-
pression in the monetary and financial forms which attract the attention of scholars and
politicians. Think for instance of the tensions between, on the one hand, the development
of women’s individual identities and access to education and specialization, necessary also
11
As Gershuny (1978) point out, the spread of self-service is the only element
in the mix that is, in theory, compatible with systems of regulation and hence
able to curb the destabilizing circuits of tertiarization. Rising demand for serv-
ices gives rise to demand for durable goods for self-provision of these same
services; such goods include motor-cars, video-recorders, computers, vending
machines, do-it-yourself tools. Low-productivity labor is supplied at no cost by
the user without any serious repercussions in terms of social inequalities while,
in general, the firms producing the durable goods are able to raise productivity
and, by reducing working hours, give their workers more time to dedicate to
self-service. However, Gershuny's hypothesis notwithstanding, no society today
can be seen to be moving towards generalized self-service, even though its
technical and organizational potential is widely exploited in all social contexts
starting with the laissez-faire variants in which the marked spread of self-service
has checked neither tertiarization nor manifest employment polarization. The
self-service factor complicates the picture of the transformations in industrial
societies, but it seems unable to lessen the tertiarization circuit's destabilizing
impact on employment regimes, which cumulates in the other three compo-
nents in the mixes. On the contrary, self-service appears to be more consonant
with laissez-faire regimes and to accentuate further tendencies towards ine-
qualities, employment polarization and social exclusion.
This incapacity on the part of self-service transformations to modify the
destabilizing effects of tertiarization can be explained. The qualitative and inter-
personal nature of the process of utilization in many services makes a general-
ized extension of self-service impossible. The impact of inequalities is seen in
the difficulty in adapting to the standard conditions of self-supply; there are
some wealthy subjects who continue to be the receivers of services and many
poor or disabled subjects who are unable to use self-service and are thus dis-
advantaged by the spread of self-service systems. Furthermore, an important
limit to self-service transformations14, understood in the broad sense of, for ex-
ample, the revolution in private car transport or that in television and infor-
matics, lies in their requiring costly public investment, which reduces the flexi-
bility and reversibility of public spending and in any case gives further impetus
to tertiarization. Consider the impact of the transformation of transport systems
to the benefit of private cars. It has underpinned expansion in a branch of
                                                                                                                                                                         
in order to implement the role of housewife  in advanced bureaucratized societies and, on
the other, the persistent discouragement of educated women to start paid work.
14 According to Gershuny and Miles (1983: 84-5), a transformation along self-service lines in
the broad sense, not just simply the spread of self-service shops, restaurants or petrol sta-
tions, depends on four preconditions: "1) investment in equipment (and purchase of neces-
sary materials), typically by the individual or household seeking the service (e.g. cars, TV,
petrol), 2) collective investment in material ('hardware') infrastructure (e.g. roads, broad-
casting networks); 3) provision of non-material activities ('software-activities', e.g. TV pro-
grammes), and other intermediate consumer services (such as maintenance of domestic
equipment); unpaid 'informal' labour, using the first three elements to produce the final
service-functions (e.g. driving a private car)."
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manufacturing (the motor industry) that is subject to increases in labor pro-
ductivity and became the symbol of the intensive historical phase. At the same
time, it diverted a large part of public investment from collective transport to the
building of infrastructures for the motor-car. This has helped to widen the ine-
quality between those who can afford a car and the users of public transport,
less efficient and more expensive following decreased investment. And it has
impeded neither the rise in public spending (in a certain sense, it has fed it by
opening up a new front for expenditure that could in no way entirely replace that
on collective transport) nor tertiarization, which has been fuelled by the prolif-
eration of car-repair shops, car and spare parts dealers, petrol stations and so
on.
In conclusion, the polarization of employment regimes, brought about more
by tertiarization than industrial restructuring, is as things stand unstoppable
even if in some variants of welfare capitalism it is partially hidden by higher pro-
portion of public employment at relatively subventioned conditions and in others
by the persistence of unpaid female care of family members. None of these
modes, however, allows the regulative balances that developed with the expan-
sion of manufacturing to resist fully. The critical tensions have not been engen-
dered so much by overproduction of poorly educated and qualified labor supply
as, conversely, by the proliferation of work opportunities without sufficient
guarantee of stability, income and working conditions to enable full and perma-
nent integration into one's community of belonging.
3. Flexibility and heterogeneity in contemporary work
biographies
Industrial restructuring and tertiarization pose a series of difficulties for the
forms of regulation of the employment regimes that developed during the inten-
sive historical cycle. On the one hand, these processes do not reduce the need
to sustain high-productivity work careers with highly articulated systems of sup-
port and selection. On the contrary, the further rise in productivity and the ad-
vent of automated and computerized systems have meant the end of the Tay-
lorist organization of work, which used poorly qualified labor and relied entirely
on intense work tempos and the fragmentation of tasks. What is needed today
is an all-round basic education, occupational training and refresher courses and
a welfare system that guarantees physical health and mental alertness; but the
continual support of a dedicated family is still useful, even in the less familistic
contexts. At least as regards male professional careers, those of married men
(with or without offspring) are on average decidedly more brilliant than those of
unmarried men. For obvious reasons, the exact converse applies to women:
those who are unmarried have reached career levels on a par with unmarried
men, while those who are married lag far behind, especially when compared
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with married men (Facchini, 1997). The simple explanation for this starts from
the observation that all the intensive breadwinner and gender-based division of
labor regimes have been constructed on the complementarity between the hus-
band’s performance in his work career and the specialization and dedication of
the wife in supporting and care activities. Career women, therefore, find them-
selves in work itineraries that require a high degree of supporting care (that
typically supplied by a wife) but which they are generally unable to obtain.
Hochschild’s research clearly shows that neither an, unusual, domestic com-
mitment by the husband nor servants, babysitters or housekeepers are an ef-
fective way of dealing with the deficit in care support, particularly where there
are small children (Hochschild, 1989).
Within the transformations under way, moreover, the decline in high-pro-
ductivity careers in manufacturing is counterbalanced by the increase in similar
careers in the advanced tertiary sector (banking, financial services, industrial
research, advertising and marketing, data elaboration and diffusion), in profes-
sional fields, and in political bureaucracy and public and private welfare serv-
ices. In many cases, the stressful intensity of political competition and pro-
fessional responsibility may be even higher than that caused by the produc-
tional mechanisms of market competition. All this signifies that the selection
and support of high-productivity and constant-income forms of work continues
to be a requirement for regulation and that a minority of workers only enjoy the
privileges from high productivity in ways that contrast with those of other
workers. The familial synthesis of socio-employment equilibria in the adult male
head of the household on a family income is working less and less as a reducer
of imbalances and employment polarization.
On the other hand, the current employment transformations are giving rise
to low-productivity and specialized15 work opportunities that have undermined
the capacity of regulatory systems to complement such situations without cre-
ating areas of chronic social disadvantage. The broad reach of public services
along Swedish lines, a marked spread of precarious work though hand in hand
with high American-style mobility, the technological and innovative adaptation
of micro firms and the modification of female domestic segregation in the Italian
or German way: none of these is any longer sufficient. Flexibility, precarious-
ness, low-income jobs are becoming more and more an open wound in the
labor regulation regimes, because they hit the forms of social integration built
                                                          
15 In many care jobs, professional competence is conventionally devalued by the fact that
such activities have not entirely entered the capitalist circuit and are, at least in part, un-
dertaken by wives or mothers at no cost. In this case, there is a persistent polarization be-
tween the specialist care professions, among the most highly paid and esteemed (like, for
example, doctors and psychiatrists) and the professions held to be more general and close
to the activities free of charge by women; they slide down the scale even when they enter
the capitalist circuit and require long periods of professional training - the clearest example
is that of the nursing profession.
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on fragile balances dictated by the need to support high-productivity
employment profiles.
The search for flexibility together with social integration has relaunched
self-employment and family micro businesses also in contexts of high prole-
tarianization16. On the whole, the dualism of the more intensive and productive
forms of wage labor and the more extensive and flexible forms of self-em-
ployment holds as a mode of regulation where the gap in productivity can be
offset by innovations that exploit flexibility rather than by lengthening the exten-
sive working life, reinventing or adapting a subsistence economy (typical, for
example, of rural indigence). These virtuous complementary conditions cannot
be applied in all the diverse contexts and areas of working activity because they
require a stable solidarity-based family and social fabric and the technical pos-
sibility to raise the productivity of more discontinuous forms of work within the
organization of micro enterprises. On this front, artisanal and manufacturing
firms have been able to benefit from technologies developed by large enter-
prises but subsequently adaptable on a reduced scale (from electrical systems
to microelectronics) and, in some contexts, from local organizational networks
that have offset the disadvantages from low economies of scale. But such solu-
tions are not valid for the entire heterogeneous sector of services, above all for
work-intensive low-qualified personal care.
What was said above with regard to self-employed careers and those in
micro enterprises in agriculture and the traditional tertiary sector in Spain and
southern Italy also applies to this area. Namely, work itineraries are less and
less desirable as they do not provide sufficient material and social resources for
survival at acceptable standards of life and for acceptance in one's own com-
munity of belonging. The extension of working times and lives and the greater
utilization of family, kinship and community solidarity are no longer able to com-
pensate for low labor productivity in social and cultural contexts with a high cost
and standard of living and a general expectation of upward social mobility. For
these reasons the vitality of self-employment and of micro enterprises does not
constitute a generally applicable solution vis-à-vis the need to find a balance
between the diffusion of more flexible work modes and the deficit in social
regulation that these modes entail. Even within self-employment and small fam-
ily businesses a growing rift is opening up between, on one side, traditional cir-
cuits, which are in growing difficulty and less and less feasible for new genera-
tions socialized into behaviour and expectations typical of a high-productivity
context, and on the other innovative circuits that create a balance between
                                                          
16 Among European countries, the UK is the one that, starting from a low level, shows the
biggest increases in the share of self-employed. In contrast, the countries of southern
Europe, where levels are still decidedly higher than the average, show a slight decline in
the same share; but this does not go against the underlying trend. The decline is due to the
reduction in the self-employed in agriculture and, to a lesser extent, in the more traditional
sectors of trade and handicraft. In these countries, too, the share of self-employed workers
in the advanced tertiary sector and some branches of industry is rising.
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flexibility and acceptable life conditions but which cannot be extended to all
sectors of the economy and are unlikely to get a foothold in contexts character-
ized by social disintegration17.
Demographic transformations also help to destabilize the regulation of
working lives. Besides longevity, the instability of marriage and low fertility rates
are modifying the interface between family support and working careers in the
direction of a growing polarization between more stable and more unstable and
socially isolated family situations. Not only do nuclear families based on a cou-
ple with young dependent offspring occupy a decreasing part of the life cycle,
they also involve a declining share of the population in ever more heterogene-
ous conditions. Furthermore, the drop in fertility weakens kinship networks
above all to the detriment of those situations in which kinship solidarity consti-
tutes a resource for micro entrepreneurship and family care work. The hetero-
geneity of family forms, characterized by rising proportions of single-parent and
reassembled families and single person units, intersects with the polarization
between families sustained by a single high income or many incomes and those
sustained by a single, and more and more frequently, discontinuous income or
excluded form work and forced to turn to welfare (Pahl, 1988 and 1988a). In
other words, whereas increasing economic demands make it necessary for all
plural households to rely on more than one source of income, a large share of
the population still depends on a single low income, which is increasingly re-
flected in the spread of poverty18. Pahl, moreover, insists on another worrying
aspect of this transformation. Multi-income families make many acquaintances
during work which are useful for improving their own working careers and find-
ing jobs for their children or kin. This is not the case, however, for families sup-
ported by unemployed or precarious workers, which are even more in need of
such acquaintances in order to change a difficult employment situation (Morris,
1990; 1992; 1995). In addition, self-provisioning opportunities - all those repair
and improvement activities related to one's own life and dwelling done directly
by household members using state-of-the-art equipment - are only feasible for
middle-income families who are well inserted in a stable social fabric, especially
if they are homeowners. Low- or precarious-income families in more unstable
and degraded social situations are excluded also from these modernized forms
of self-provided consumption. Another way of putting it is that what until a few
decades ago was a defensive strategy of the poorest rural families has now be-
come merely an opportunity for middle-income groups further to improve their
standard of living vis-à-vis that of low-income groups. Under these conditions,
                                                          
17 In the Italian case, the persistent division between the more dynamic centre-north, with its
lower rates of unemployment, and the south, underdeveloped and characterized by very
high rates of joblessness is also the outcome of the strong diffusion of small dynamic firms
in the north, while in the south predominate inefficient traditional enterprises in agriculture,
building, petty commerce and services, which are unable to provide new jobs for young
people.
18 In the case of Italy, this process provides the most convincing explanation for the growing
concentration of poverty in urban areas in the south (see Mingione, 1996).
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therefore, the rift between "work-rich families" and "work-poor families" turns
into a real circuit of social polarization (Pahl, 1988a).
The big employment changes of the last few decades have been variously
interpreted as contingent phenomena that require modifications to the iron laws
of market mechanisms or as an epochal transformation of the same mecha-
nisms, now at the mythical stage of globalization. However, market tensions
have long since learned to cross borders, though obviously in historically
changing ways. It has been above all the debates on informal activities and
jobs19 and, subsequently, that on the formation of an underclass20  - a group in-
stitutionally and chronically excluded from opportunities and life conditions typi-
cal of one's own community - and on social exclusion which have pointed to the
node of the social regulation of working activities as a critical point in the trans-
formations under way.
We can speak of a crisis in wage-work regulative regimes not so much be-
cause they are too rigid and costly vis-à-vis the new demands of global compe-
tition - this is what the majority of politicians and social scientists conditioned by
the market paradigm still believe - but because, under the economic, social and
demographic conditions that are developing, these same regimes engender
rising levels of social disintegration that end up eroding the potential for coop-
eration indispensable for the functioning of an economy, necessarily embedded
in a social order.
The fundamental question, therefore, is not the direct cost or education and
training of labor in high-productivity manufacturing and economic services ex-
posed to international competition. These sectors employ a declining share of
the workforce. Their capacity to control the relation between the cost of labor
and productivity and market share depends on social and political factors that
                                                          
19 The debate on informal activities in the industrialized countries went through a particularly
intensive phase during the 1980s. The term "informal" was used for the first time by Hart
(1973) in a study for the International Labour Bureau on the urban economy of an African
city (Accra in Ghana), characterized by a persistent mix of subsistence activities with pre-
carious market-oriented jobs. Towards the end of the 1970s, the term was imported into
the industrialized countries to indicate no longer a sector and a particular locality but activi-
ties and forms of work that avoid state controls because either they are not identified, re-
corded and taxed (like occasional jobs and self-provisioning) or they are carried out in vio-
lation of existing regulations (like undeclared multiple activities and work as an employee
without a contract, national insurance and taxation) (Ferman et al., 1978; Ferman and
Berndt, 1981; Pahl 1984).
20 The term "underclass" was created in the US with particularly in mind the life conditions of
Afro-Americans concentrated in the big city ghettos (Wilson, 1987 and 1990) while that of
social exclusion came much more recently into the debate, also at an official level, within
the countries of the European Union (Castel, 1995 and 1995a; Silver 1996). See the first
and last chapters of Mingione (1996a) for a discussion of the connection between the two
concepts of underclass and social exclusion and for references to the relevant literature.
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explain why in the global economy highly diversified wage levels can continue
side by side and why industrial restructuring has been intense but only under-
mined the productive hierarchy to a limited extent. It is the division of labor
typical of high-productivity wage regimes that has entered into a crisis since the
ever widening area of social care activities, unpaid or too low-paid to be eco-
nomically viable, has outstripped the redistributive capacities developed in vari-
ous ways by the intensive regimes.21
The crisis of the intensive division of labor is reflected in two distinct syn-
dromes present to varying degrees in all the models and variants. The more the
redistributive modes are defended and extended to offset the growing deficits in
social care, the more the crisis takes on the form of growing costs and rigidity,
as happens above all in continental Europe. Conversely, the more the redistri-
butive modes are allowed to decline so as to foster the spread of flexible and
atypical forms of work, the more the crisis is reflected directly in increasing pov-
erty and forms of social exclusion, as is the case above all in the US and the
UK. Both these processes are syndromes of the crisis and thus cannot be in-
terpreted as regulative innovation strategies. It is for this reason that neither the
all-out defence of welfare programmes nor deregulation are giving rise to new
and lasting prospects of synergy between economy and society.
4. The confines of inclusion and exclusion in diverse socio-
economic contexts
The problem of social exclusion lies not so much in the presence or extent of
inequalities or social unease. The intensive regimes were characterized by
marked inequalities and widely felt unease. But both phenomena were attenu-
ated by the growth dynamics and redistributive mechanisms that prevented
conditions of chronic disadvantage from crystallizing and transformed both
transitory problem syndromes and structural discrimination into synergetic fac-
tors that, in turn, fed further economic growth. In a certain sense, rural indi-
gence, the extremely tough social selection of immigrants, minorities and recent
urban migrants, and gender discrimination constituted essential key ingredients
in feeding intensive growth and consolidating the forms of social integration
                                                          
21 The crisis of the redistributive balance takes place also in the conservative variants of wel-
fare capitalism even if it is less visible from a macro redistributive point of view as a per-
sistently large part of care and support activities takes place in terms of unpaid female work
in the family. On the one side, the support of the family wage by public transfer payments is
eroded by the decline of stable forms of male employment and by the fiscal crisis of the
state confronted with increasingly complex and heterogeneous needs. On the other, the di-
versification of household forms and the massive, even if delayed, entry of women into the
labor market weaken the efficacy of the familial micro redistribution processes.
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typical of that historical cycle. Today, on the contrary, the flexibilization of
working careers and the instability and heterogeneity of family biographies re-
flect not only a higher degree of individualism and freedom of choice. Because
the new production regime enforces discontinuities and frequent passages
through situations in which individuals are not sufficiently protected by family,
community, work or state resources, many people end up in difficulties that
tend to become chronic and, hence, with a large deficit in social integration.
This deficit consolidates an area of disadvantage which has high economic
costs and does not lead to sufficient advantages favouring further growth22.
The failure of the current large-scale strategies for attacking or defending
the intensive welfare balances confirms the diagnosis: the transition requires a
redesigning of social regulation that cannot be obtained by speeding up the
process of rendering family and work biographies more precarious or by de-
fending to the utmost the guarantees and divisions typical of the welfare
systems. Indeed, apart from partial, sectorial and temporary outcomes, by
speeding up the dismantlement of welfare the strategies accompanying the
transformation not only increase the production of poverty and exclusion, but
also do not engender competitive conditions leading to economic superiority in
the global market, as demonstrated by the cases of the UK and the US. At the
opposite pole, all-out defence of welfare institutions does not just create prob-
lems for the state's finances and inhibit the development of innovative forms of
economic organization; it is not even able to check the erosion of integration
balances, as the cases of the countries in continental Europe demonstrate.
Before concluding, we need to return to the social exclusion syndromes in the
diverse models of welfare capitalism in order better to understand why flexibili-
zation and deregulation or the defence of intensive-regime institutions and
guarantees cannot succeed by themselves in bringing about new dynamic
growth regimes, even though they are largely dominant as feasible political
strategies for attaining goals of economic efficiency and prosperity.
In the case of the US and the variants of the laissez-faire model, the last
twenty years have been dominated by strategies of privatization that foster the
spread of atypical jobs within an unstable and heterogeneous demographic
context. These strategies manage to contain unemployment and public spend-
ing but, at the same time, they create a large number of families supported by
workers on inadequate incomes and widen the gap between areas of society
where the advantages of financial speculation are concentrated and chronically
disadvantaged areas. Within these models the social crisis is alarming and re-
                                                          
22 In a recent article significantly entitled „Positive functions of the undeserving poor: uses of
the underclass in America“, Gans (1994) dwells on the functions taken on by even the
acutest forms of poverty, especially in terms of drawing an artificial line between success
and failure that ends by consolidating the social links between those who are integrated to
the detriment of the excluded. The American sociologist's thinking is plausible but under-
estimates the impact of the erosion of sociality bonds and, consequently, of the minimum
conditions permitting economic cooperation.
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gards above all the fact that a sizeable minority, generally segregated in
ghettos or rundown neighbourhoods in big cities, endures very hard life condi-
tions, is cut off from any prospects, opportunities and rights and has no hope of
benefiting from any upturns in the economy because overwhelmed by a malign
circuit of drift that is difficult to stop23. But the real problem is that from a strictly
economic standpoint, these strategies do not bring any significant advantages
in terms of competitivity and development. The effects from the flexibilization of
work careers are concentrated above all in services while deregulation and the
worsening social climate lead to difficulties in the training, selection and support
of high-productivity workers and, hence, render the industrial structures vulner-
able to penetration by foreign capital. In this respect, the case of the UK is sig-
nificant24.
From an economistic point of view, the UK today is to be envied: state fi-
nances in order; falling rate of unemployment; above-average economic
growth. But underlying this miracle, based on the flexibilization of the labor
market and dismantling of welfare guarantees, the economic and social picture
is anything but rosy. The old manufacturing machinery that was already ill-
suited to the requirements of the intensive cycle has been swept aside by de-
industrialization (Massey and Meagan, 1982). The Thatcher reforms completed
the job by undermining welfare guarantees in favour of financial specialization
and an economy based on low wages and scarcely regulated working condi-
tions. So today, on the economic front, "...British manufactures have 'the worst
of all worlds', lacking the independence and power to move into high-value-
added, small batch production but denied the stability and size of orders neces-
sary to reap the traditional benefits of economies of scale" (Rubery, 1994: 336).
At the same time, on the social front, a high and growing number of heteroge-
neous familial configurations supported by low and discontinuous incomes
earned in private services and the new industrial structure, decentralized from
                                                          
23 It is above all the recent literature on the ghetto poor and the underclass in the US that has
brought into focus the interweaving of and prospects for the exclusion syndromes as
malign circuits having an also negative economic effect (see Wilson, 1987, 1993, and
1996; Massey and Denton, 1993; Katz, 1993; Kazepov and Mingione, 1994). In these
cases a thorough study has been carried out of the negative intertwining between social,
environmental and working conditions and of their impact in terms of making irreversible
drift towards marginalization. This situation affects above all a part of the black and Puerto
Rican minorities that have remained segregated in the big city ghettos after the relocation
of the new middle classes from these communities to the suburbs. One of the most worry-
ing problems in the American case is that the exclusion syndromes are spreading to other
minorities, starting with the substantial and growing group of Central-American immigrants
(Moore and Pinderhughes, 1993).
24 Rubery (1994: 335-6) points out the most significant aspects of this syndrome. "Britain is
becoming notorious within the European Union as the one country not to endorse the high-
skill, high-value-added model for the future of an integrated Europe....The UK is content to
compete for jobs and for trade on the basis of low wage levels, even at the expense of pro-
ductivity....Flexibility in the production systems in many consumer industries has thus been
used to provide flexibility to the the large and dominant retail chains and not to enhance the
market position of the producer."
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abroad and dominated by commercial considerations, or excluded from the
labor market (Buck, 1996) lie below the poverty line and passively submit to a
strong attack on social integration25. The erosion of a minimum climate of co-
operation indispensable for sustaining a market economy is already far ad-
vanced, although it has not reached the level of acceleration typical of the US.
Those most hit by exclusion syndromes are above all the former working-class
population in the de-industrialized cities, like Liverpool and Newcastle, the more
poorly educated West-Indian minority destined for the more humble jobs in the
private tertiary sector and the single-income families supported by women con-
fined to low-income part-time jobs. The basic picture is worrying because the
partial economic success of this model offers this growing minority of the
population no opportunities for escaping from difficult life conditions, bordering
on exclusion and lead to tensions that risk bringing about a further deteriora-
tion. The inability to modernize and innovate the educational and vocational
training systems, the abandonment of preventive policies in health and deviant
crime, and the deterioration in public services enlarge, in connection with the
greater instability of family and work biographies, the bottom layer of the popu-
lation at risk of marginalization. All this, while increasing advantages are being
cumulated for an industrial structure that is less and less controllable on a na-
tional scale and for an increasingly speculation-oriented elite. Under different
conditions, models of this kind appear to renew a circuit typically found in pro-
cesses of underdevelopment rather than to produce synergies between differ-
ent conditions of economic growth and forms of regulation compatible with the
new features of individualism and familial and occupational instability.
The case of the UK helps to show that the new regulatory models for
fragmented societies cannot rest on the low cost of labor and flexible and
unstable employment conditions. The US confirms this hypothesis in a different
version since the latter is founded on the transformation of the dualism between
the official high-productivity economy and the poor but dynamic economies of
immigrants and minorities towards a heightened polarization, in which the
transition erodes the prospects of mobility that characterized the intensive
regimes. In this case, the appearance of economic success derives not only
from the low unemployment levels and increasing cheap flexible and atypical
labor, above all in private services, but also from the strong financial drainage
and the expansion of employment in the tertiary economy of global cities
(Sassen, 1991 and 1996). These phenomena were inherited from the intensive
hegemony of the US and are still reflected in the country's political and military
power and in a, though decreasing, technological supremacy.
                                                          
25 Particularly evident is the increasing poverty among "...women not embedded in the
standard nuclear family, as women's wage and employment opportunities are still geared to
second-income-earner status" (Rubery, 1994: 349). In this case too, it is the combination of
rising numbers of vulnerable familial configurations and poor employment opportunities and
biographies -in the UK women jobs are above all part-time - that produces the increase in
female poverty.
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However, also the American model has its costs and negative synergies. It
is not only a question of the critical situation in which the most disadvantaged
minorities in the big city ghettos are trapped, or the fact that for the last twenty
years the US has held the negative record for the highest share of population
below the poverty line among industrial countries or that the cost of social con-
trol and repression (police forces and prisons, the legal system) is high and
growing out of control. The American model is now undermining both the foun-
dations of social stability that guaranteed living conditions for a broad middle
stratum of blue- and white-collar workers, employed in the large vertically inte-
grated groups, and the conditions for economic mobility that allowed the inte-
gration of increasing masses of immigrants and fed the dynamic dualism typical
of the intensive synergy. On both fronts, areas of chronic marginalization are
emerging that bring no economic benefits. In the first case, there is an increas-
ing number of middle-aged subjects who are made redundant and forced to ac-
cept worse employment conditions and of young people with an average edu-
cation and high expectations who remain trapped in unstable and underpaid
work itineraries in private services. In the second case, there is the uncertain
destiny of a high number of Central American immigrants who stay trapped in
precarious employment with no outlets either in ethnic enclaves or through oc-
cupational promotion. Here we have, among other things, a slice of the popula-
tion at a high level of fertility in which precocious and numerous families are
formed and whose children suffer discrimination in terms of language and ac-
cess to adequate educational and training services. Thus, a clear rift is opening
up between the demographically more dynamic part and the rest of the Ameri-
can population. The uncheckable rising poverty among Hispanics and the
parallel discrimination and closure towards clandestine immigrants are signs
that a period is coming to a close in which immigration was a process with a
high human cost, but was undoubtedly significant for its synergy with the model
of economic development centred on the growth of big high-productivity in-
dustry and consumerism.
In almost all the other variants, strategies in defence of welfare tend to pre-
vail even if in circumstances marked by the alternation of different political coa-
litions, more or less favourable to the socialdemocratic regime of rights won by
organized trade unions, and by the financial problems besetting national states.
Nor does the defence of welfare structures represent an innovative answer to
the problems caused by the transition, above all because it reproposes exces-
sive protection favouring breadwinner regimes, covering a declining share of
the population, and leaves few resources for the protection of a growing area of
difficult social situations. This kind of approach is generally opposed by econo-
mists as it leads to increasing costs and rigidities and hinders the spread of
flexible low-cost forms of work that, in theory, should encourage a new process
of growth. Sociologists, on the contrary, are in principle more favourable to
welfarist policies since they are sensitive to the fact that such policies are able
to keep a certain degree of control over the destabilization of the social situa-
tion and to check the faster development of chronic poverty and exclusion;
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moreover, they are more sceptical about the prospects for growth models
based on low-cost labor. In this debate, the importance that sociologists at-
tribute to medium- and long-term prospects and to the phenomena of
"reflexivity" of social constructions also comes into play. In this sense, it is as-
sumed that by destroying the potential for cooperation, the complicated inter-
play of feedback and unexpected effects causes irreversible and unforeseeable
damage not only to the social order but also to economic equilibria26.
The more fragile confines of the defence of welfarist structures are marked
by two interconnected questions: immigration and unemployment27. All ad-
vanced industrial societies, characterized by a radical tertiarization and a re-
duced demographic dynamic, are attracting a growing number of immigrants to
be confined in the least skilled services and at the same time show a deficit in
continuous work opportunities that meet the expectations of the indigenous
population. This represents a problematical combination for the social and eco-
nomic structures. The immigrants are indispensable for keeping down the cost
of increasingly privatized services; but it is precisely for this reason that they are
confined in an area of persistent marginality with low incomes and limited ac-
cess to citizenship rights. Masses of drifting immigrants from a wide variety of
localities have few possibilities of consolidating forms of ethnic solidarity and
are exposed to the perverse circuit of discrimination. The contextual rise in un-
employment levels encourages the belief that immigrants take jobs and re-
sources away from the indigenous population, thereby activating a controversial
political circuit conditioned by a besieged fortress mentality according to which
a mass of foreigners, beggars and deviants undermine citizens' living conditions
and their security. The need to keep the borders open to a quota of immigrants
for use in low-cost services clashes with a climate of intolerance fuelled also by
the fact that the very scarcity of the resources available for immigrant insertion,
since tailored to the requirement of holding down the cost of services, makes
itineraries of even selective integration of immigrants problematical. All the
major countries of continental Europe are plagued by this problem, which ends
in the creation of an area of uncontrollable social exclusion.
                                                          
26 See apropos, among others, Boudon, 1984; Bauman, 1993; Giddens, 1990 and 1991;
Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994 and also the essay by the intellectual financier Soros (1997)
on the open society.
27 The only exception of some weight is Japan, where both the growing migratory invasion,
which is also, within certain limits, beginning to be a problem (Sassen, 1991) and rising un-
employment are kept under tighter control by the rigid dualistic balances between core
sectors, subsidiary sectors and the complementary role of family and kin, as always char-
acterized by heavy discrimination against women. But in this case too, the intensive bal-
ances are in crisis because overextensive subsidiary sectors and more and more fragile
families overburdened with responsibilities are unable to complement further the develop-
ments of the big groups, increasingly oriented towards global financial speculation.
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On the unemployment front, the situation is just as controversial and en-
genders moves to destabilize welfare structures that follow two different lines
according to whether the unemployed receive benefit, as in the socialdemoc-
ratic and statist variants, or do not receive any public income supplement, as in
the familistic variants (Therborn, 1986; Pugliese, 1993)28. In the first case, the
structural increase in unemployment has direct repercussions on state finances
and forces reductions in benefits and/or cuts in other welfare programmes,
which is inevitably translated into the undermining of social support and the
widening of the area at risk of exclusion. The welfare blanket has become too
short on all sides and this is giving rise to conflicts that are difficult to control in
the context of an employment structure that is producing a diminishing propor-
tion of sufficiently stable and adequately paid job opportunities. On the other
hand, employment trends cannot be manipulated within the dualistic structure
imposed by high productivity and are less and less sensitive to cyclical phe-
nomena. In order to address the question structurally, a radical transformation
of the occupational system is required that can rediscover care and support ac-
tivities and redistribute productive tasks so as to close the deficit in socially self-
sustaining work opportunities.
In the familistic variants, unemployment chiefly translates into a block on
entering the world of work for young people and women seeking a first job or a
new one after an interruption due to maternity (Pugliese, 1993; Mingione and
Pugliese, 1994 and 1995; Reyneri, 1996). Generally speaking, the unemployed
are not maintained by state benefits but by their families during the long periods
of waiting, or they live on their wits and do black work and occasional jobs. The
high levels of long-term unemployment fuel the spread of economic poverty
even though most poor families are not such due to the family head being job-
less and the majority of the unemployed do not live in poor families (Mingione,
1996). Joblessness and poverty tend to be concentrated in the depressed re-
gions and in areas badly affected by de-industrialization, above all in certain
districts in the big cities. Here perverse circuits and areas of chronic social dis-
advantage come into being that turn into forms of exclusion, different in kind but
with a potential to undermine social cohesion equal to those affecting the ghetto
poor in the big American cities (Morlicchio, 1996 and 1996a). In these cases
also, the welfare blanket, in its historically structured form and limited by finan-
cial circumstances, is too short to cover the problems arising from the transition
without opening up deep splits in the existing social and economic fabric.
                                                          
28 The main difference is between a large majority of the unemployed supported by unem-
ployment benefits or, at least, by reasonably high minimum income subsides in central
European countries and a large majority of the unemployed, young or female, who are not
entitled to any public transfer payments and survive because they are supported by the
family and/or by access to casual and temporary informal jobs, as is the case in southern
European countries.
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In short, neither the approaches based on liberalization nor those in
defence of welfare regimes are framing the regulative perspectives typical of
fragmented societies. The third ways already exist but are not very visible and
cannot be generalized, given that fragmentation leads to considerable
dishomogeneity and the spread of local and sectorial experiences differing the
one from the other.
At this point, some conclusive remarks can be made on what are the main
critical nodes in the regulative reshaping of the transformation in progress. As
has been seen, the employment transition brings about varied mixes of high
unemployment rates and the spread of  heterogeneous, unstable and, often,
poorly paid work. This process helps to disarm the typically intensive (Fordist)
integration mechanisms, which through a varied set of redistributive processes
(public or familial) made social inclusion possible also for subjects with no in-
come or with inadequate and discontinuous incomes. As the Dutch case has
recently shown, where a large amount of voluntary part-time work has helped to
reduce unemployment without any effect on the level of poverty, the new flexi-
ble work itineraries do not automatically lead to a rising deficit in social integra-
tion. This is only the case, however, when they come with new kinds of guar-
antees and protection that allow unstable and atypical workers to live in the
cultural and social conditions of their own community of belonging.
The most important question emerging from our investigation is that the di-
vision between productive and reproductive activities, as it developed in the
building of industrial economies, has been taken to its utmost limits by the in-
tensive regimes and cannot hold any further. The reproductive area, devalued
by the advent of monetary economies, can no longer remain self-supporting; at
the same time, however, it has become too costly to be maintained by a smaller
and smaller productive sector stifled by a virtual financial economy many times
larger than the real economy. The crisis of welfare and the bureaucratic appa-
ratuses, the growing importance of solidarity and voluntary associations and
networks, the emphasis on activities for the common good, the heterogeneous
configuration of support systems, the innovative revitalization of reciprocity in-
stitutions are the contradictory signals of this transition towards overcoming the
now suffocating division between reproductive activities of low economic value
and productive activities. The point is that it is on this very division that eco-
nomic calculations and social regulation are still based, beginning with the so-
cialization processes and the structuring of gender differences. In this sense,
the construction of new regulative balances constitutes an extremely difficult
transition. The massive entry of women into continuous work itineraries and the
emphasis on equal opportunities - above all when accompanied by a less ca-
reer-oriented downsizing of male occupational itineraries in favour of a redistri-
bution of care responsibilities -, the increasing importance of social networks
and agencies of solidarity and voluntary work within the more dynamic local
economies, and the tendency to redesign working biographies in more flexible
terms, with breaks for vocational training, cultural improvement and taking on
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social responsibilities, are currents of transformation that can be useful for
building new balances. These tendencies, however, meet with resistance not
only from the cultural set-ups that developed during the intensive cycle but also
from the strong claims made on the economy by the financial sector. The dis-
cord in the European Union over the Maastricht parameters is an example of a
difficult dilemma involving opposed visions: that favouring the framing of new
rules for the embeddedment of economic life and that advocating the sacrifice
of social balance to the financial benefits of monetary integration in an area of
productional supremacy but growing social tensions.
Another way or reading the transition's critical currents comes from the fact
that the minimum balance between utilization of potential labor and satisfaction
of needs has broken down. The intensive balances leave a growing share of
labor power in a state of idleness or underemployment and, in parallel, an
increasing number of needs unmet in the sphere of poverty, marginalization
and exclusion (Lunghini, 1995). This widening imbalance is dictated by the
"iron" rules of the market economy in which working activities and needs are
rigidly measured in monetary terms. Self-consumption, unpaid reproductive ac-
tivities, solidarity and social capital constitute marginal modalities within this
system of rules for value-adding; hence they are, under many aspects, imprac-
ticable for linking on a large scale unused working energies with unsatisfied life
needs. The history of industrial growth models is paved with the "submerged"
importance of these invisible modalities, but always as appendices of a regime
centred on the dominance of monetary relations. The question for the regula-
tory patterns of future societies is whether a different balance is feasible, one
that is no longer subservient to the monetary regime and in which various com-
binations of unused working energies and unsatisfied needs help to create
ways of living that do not stifle the course of the monetary economy, but do not
end either in a growing deficit in sociality destined to jeopardize the minimum
levels of cooperation indispensable for implementing socially embedded eco-
nomic life.
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